Why was Google Taiwan included in the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee?
After the committee member list was announced (Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee), the overall composition was surprising. However, what’s worth discussing is why Google Taiwan has a representative on the committee. Although it’s not unprecedented for government-initiated committees in Taiwan to include Google—such as in digital economic development committees—the high-profile involvement in disaster preparedness and even geopolitical security matters suggests there must be something special about this "representation" and "agency."
If this is about having enough geopolitical strength to be "representative," let's recall several past incidents:
These major "events" or projects all involve how Google views the division of labor with Taiwanese companies, and shifts in this perspective directly dictate the representativeness of Google Taiwan regarding societal resilience. Perhaps the government and Google are discussing different angles of collaboration.
The first thing that comes to mind is the Changhua data center. In theory, these matters could be discussed through proper channels without being brought to public attention. However, due to the center’s massive scale—one of the most important in Asia—and its status as a U.S. company, even if it’s not classified under CI/CII (Critical Infrastructure/Critical Information Infrastructure) protection, does it still require protection from the National Police Agency or civil forces?
On second thought, this might not need to be publicly discussed.
The second is the FASTER submarine cable system, co-managed by Google, with a landing point in Tamsui. Since Google is one of the companies that funded and built this cable and has a significant footprint in Taiwan, in the event of an unexpected geopolitical conflict, the government might need to negotiate special agreements to access the FASTER cable for outbound communication. Because it’s well-known that this cable is managed by U.S.-based Google, it might be less susceptible to sabotage.
As for Google’s various public affairs feedback programs, they seem less relevant in this context—unless they involve specialized capacity-building programs related to "civilian training." This aspect could be quite interesting or could simply become a commercial, KPI-driven initiative. Given Google's emergency response experience during the Ukraine conflict, these efforts might also be considered "feedback" contributing to Taiwan's societal resilience. However, I personally believe that very few people within Google's Taiwan team are assigned to handle these matters.
"Operation Aurora" and "Dragonfly" happened quite some time ago, so let’s set them aside for now. It’s possible that many within Google Taiwan today have never heard of them.
On the other hand, Google once had Project Loon, a communication balloon initiative for low-latitude regions. But in this era—where LEO (Low Earth Orbit) satellite development is booming—that experience is neither helpful nor relevant to Taiwan's Air Force. From the perspective of Taiwan's large mobile/hardware teams, the relevance may lie in Pixel phones supporting 5G NTN, providing satellite messaging services for consumers during emergencies. However, this would require breakthroughs in related telecommunications regulations and certification processes. If that happens, Google Taiwan's participation would indeed be highly representative and agentive.
Or perhaps, since Google is already an approved JWCC (Joint Warfighting Cloud Capability) vendor, certain facilities in Taiwan must go through them, making Google Taiwan's representativeness absolutely sufficient?
The above points are shared for discussion.
(Original post published in Chinese on Sept. 2024)