Disinformation is an Information Environment Problem
The piece was originally drafted for an expert working group at the invitation of INDSR (Taiwan) and DKI-APCSS in May 2022. You can find further information from a similar piece by K.S. Park.
In the wake of the regional conflict happening in Ukraine and the global COVID-19 pandemic, the need for accurate information has never been more critical to the survival of affected individuals and vulnerable groups that often find themselves ensnared in an information space hostile to them. In our empirical studies, we find those who had better access and means attached to their communities are often more resilient and stable in a major crisis, thus reducing risks associated with the harms of disinformation at the local level.
Understanding the Information Environment
“Big tech” and internet platforms do enjoy healthy dominance over information space in modern times, as we deep dive into communities, we find how people consume media in the online world or why they trust a piece of information through a channel is not very well-understood in the region. This often casts a shadow on any intervening stakeholders to support and assist in different phases of crisis response. A user in her 30s taking a baby with her might have to solely rely on a short video platform to aid her way out of an evacuation plan—which had never been envisioned by the original platform designer as we have observed in the Ukraine war (2022). In the previous years of COVID-19, more communities had to rely on the internet to support every aspect of their lives. How this pandemic has changed the information landscape is yet to be studied.
We argue that “orienting” social norms at the local level to strengthen communication resilience to the harms of disinformation has to take into consideration of laws, architecture (technology), and market forces applicable to a particular country concerning the “acting” information environment. This seemingly daunting task is often beyond the scope of knowledge from any single stakeholder’s responsibility and capacity. Although the online environment is not the only information channel per se, it poses a particular threat to situational awareness for policymakers, interveners, and operators on the ground for both short-term response planning and long-term stability. Having a rapid understanding of critical dimensions of empowering factors in a particular information environment in a certain territory or demography would be complementary to existing frameworks of intervention—which are at bags of any experienced benevolent actors.
Information space also constitutes pre-existing layers that support the space to be operable at all levels of the TCP/IP internet. What seems to be irrelevant at the “physical level” (e.g. submarine cable for island territories) could be very well disrupted in a single incident, thus effectively cutting a territory out of the global information ecosystem. A ban on an IP address block from a dominant technology platform in a country could leave tens of thousands of innocent citizens even more vulnerable to internal manipulation. Stakeholders that keep the internet alive are not quite brought on to the table of public discourse on disinformation yet, but just as we had never thought that a global pandemic would have a chance to occur in the 21 century, it would happen in a kinetic conflict. All stakeholders need to be addressed in this security field to protect local communities.
Disaster, Information Vacuum, Disinformation, and the Looping Cycle
We usually find ourselves having zero information when an event breaks out in a certain remote place, and people being affected by the group are rushing to sources that are available at hand. The supply of information is at its lowest level when a major disaster hits, but the demand for correct information skyrockets within a very short time frame. This unbalance of information demand and supply leaves a vacuum for manipulation, and is at the hands of an adversary who intends to orchestrate an information campaign that causes harm more than good.
For a prolonged crisis like COVID-19 or the war in Ukraine, a series of events are seen as recurring tides and waves, and targeted exploitation of this vacuum gradually consolidates as a norm contributing force. Once a sizable population in a designated area has gravitated toward this “trap,” it becomes a nightmare for any actions that aim to reduce risks and save lives in a crisis.
If information supply and demand is architected without considering how to address this vacuum—or in other terms, windows of opportunity—with that in mind, not optimizing resilience at the local level, communities would be true victims at different stages of responses, and that vulnerability will often be exploited and reinforced in the next loop.
Rethinking Capacity Building Mechanisms
Individuals who are gravitated toward hostile information space are at times trapped without their own perception. Information is critical to all aspects of life, but the tendency to act under the influence of disinformation could turn into a “perennial illness” which exacerbates the security problem in a major crisis for any single person. Preparedness is always a long-term investment, and we find ideas of capacity building originating from the public health sector could provide novel ways on strengthening resilience to disinformation at the local level. For instance, public health and social measures mandated to protect pre-schoolers, teenagers or retired pensioners would be very different, considering that they are at different stages of mental and physical readiness.
The current global information environment favors strong and direct exploitations through big platforms between malign actors and consumers. Individual often feels so vulnerable facing a deluge of information flooding. To encourage and empower the individual to be resilient in a hostile information environment, barriers to the production of information relevant to the vicinity of his/her own life should be reduced so one can exercise his/her mind to support domestic actions, as compared to serving as a node of disinformation augmentation through individual’s cyber persona. Accessibility of tools to create an information space should be invested, and this path could prove to be extremely valuable when the indigenous information ecosystem is completely cut out from the o